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U.S. V. PARKER: WILL THOSE WITH STANDING PLEASE
STAND UP
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose the United States Congress passed a law that required all
state senates to be comprised of 25 members. This would obviously be
an invasion of the state sovereignty guaranteed by the Tenth Amend-
ment. However, who could maintain a suit to fight this law? Could the
state? Could a displaced senator? Could a citizen claiming vote dilu-
tion? Would it make a difference if the state agreed? Each of these
questions involves the issue of standing.
In the case of United States v. Parker,' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed a circuit split on whether a pri-
vate individual had standing to pursue a Tenth Amendment claim.2 The
preliminary issue in such a claim is whether a private individual may
allege that a federal action has infringed a state's rights in violation of
the Tenth Amendment, or whether the state is the only entity with stand-
ing to pursue such a claim.
This survey examines the Tenth Circuit's approach to private stand-
ing in suits challenging federal action under the Tenth Amendment, as
demonstrated by United States v. Parker. Part II provides a general
background on the Tenth Amendment and the issue of standing. Part III
considers the precedential backdrop, including past Tenth Circuit deci-
sions and holdings from other circuits. Part IV will examine the Parker
case, including the facts and the holding. Finally, Part V will analyze the
holding of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in that case.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Tenth Amendment
The Tenth Amendment reserves for the states any power "not dele-
gated to the United States ' 3 nor "prohibited ... to the states. ''4 Courts
have interpreted this amendment as the manifestation of the framers'
intent to maintain the dual sovereignty of federal and state governments.
5
The powers granted to these sovereigns are only over people, not over
each other.6 In general, the federal government cannot "commandeer"
1. 362 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004).
2. Parker, 362 F.3d at 1284-85.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
4. Id.
5. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997).
6. Printz, 521 U.S. at 920.
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state legislatures.7  When such commandeering occurs, a state will usu-
ally bring a challenge to the federal action, claiming that it improperly
infringed upon an issue of local concern.8 Other times, however, private
plaintiffs have sought to vindicate these rights.9
In furtherance of the dual sovereignty principle, neither sovereign
can agree to the relinquishment of any sovereign power.10 In the hypo-
thetical presented in the introduction, the law mandating the structure of
the state senate is unconstitutional, even if the state agreed to its terms.
Under the Articles of Confederation, the national government gen-
erally lacked the power to regulate individuals. In fact, the Confederate
government only had "greatly restricted" power over the states. 1 In con-
trast, the Constitution created a federal government that acted directly
upon its citizens. 12 Also in contrast to the Articles of Confederation, the
new Constitution did not retain for the states any power not "expressly"
delegated to the federal government.1 3  This left room under the new
constitution for incidental and implied powers.
The framers of the Constitution, in particular James Madison, cre-
ated the Tenth Amendment to alleviate the anti-federalists' fears that the
federal government may encroach on the sovereignty of the states in an
exercise of legitimate power. 14  In fact, the Tenth Amendment was
probably necessary to convince the states to ratify the Constitution.
15
Before the Constitution, the people vested power in the states. 16  The
Constitution, with the states' consent as evidenced by the ratifications,
granted some of these powers to the new federal government.' 7 Since the
federal government is one of "enumerated powers," it is necessarily re-
stricted to those powers "delegated to the United States."' 8 The states
retained, and continue to retain, all other powers.
7. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992).
8. Ara B. Gershengom, Note: Private Party Standing To Raise Tenth Amendment Comman-
deering Challenges, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1065, 1066 [hereinafter, Gershengorn].
9. Id.
10. New York, 505 U.S. at 182.
11. Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1869).
12. Oregon, 74 U.S. at 76.
13. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 404 (1819).
14. Gershengom, supra note 8, at 1083-84; United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
15. Justice Powell stated:
[Elight States voted for the Constitution only after proposing amendments to be adopted
after ratification. All eight of these included among their recommendations some version
of what later became the Tenth Amendment. So strong was the concern that the proposed
Constitution was seriously defective without a specific bill of rights, including a provi-
sion reserving powers to the States, that in order to secure the votes for ratification, the
Federalists eventually conceded that such provisions were necessary.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 569 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (cita-
tions omitted).
16. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 403.
17. Id. at 403-04.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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Until the twentieth century, courts treated the Tenth Amendment as
a "truism" that did not perform any "substantive independent work." 19
This is illustrated by United States v. Darby,2 ° where the Court stated:
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not
been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to
suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between
the national and state governments ... or that its purpose was other
than to allay fears that the new national government might seek to
exercise powers not granted, and that the states might not be able to
exercise fully their reserved powers.21
The Tenth Amendment made a brief jurisprudential appearance in
1976 with the National League of Cities v. Usery22 decision. In Usery,
the Court held that the Fair Labor Standards Act, which set minimum
wage standards, would violate the Tenth Amendment if applied to the
states. The Usery Court held that the Tenth Amendment was a limitation
on the Article I powers of Congress, which in this case was the Com-
merce Power.23 This was the first substantive use of the Tenth Amend-
ment. Subsequent cases followed the Usery reasoning until 1985.24
In 1985, Justice Blackmun, having concurred in Usery, wrote the
majority opinion for the Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority.25 In Garcia, Blackmun rejected the substantive role of
the Tenth Amendment. Garcia again involved the Fair Labor Standards
Act, this time applied to a municipal transit authority. Rejecting the
Tenth Amendment as a limitation on federal power, the Court held that
"procedural safeguards," such as the political process was the only pro-
tection of state sovereignty.26 Thus, the Tenth Amendment was again
relegated as a "truism" with no substantive power.
The Tenth Amendment reappeared again in 1992, in New York v.
United States.27 In the New York decision, the Court held that the Tenth
Amendment prevented the federal government from "commandeering"
19. Gershengom, supra note 8, at 1068.
20. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
21. Gershengorn, supra note 8, at 1068 (quoting United States v. Darby 312 U.S. 100, 124
(1941)).
22. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
23. Id. at 845. Article I, § 8 lists the powers of the legislative branch, such as the power to lay
taxes, regulate commerce, and declare war. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
24. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981)
(analyzing whether the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act was a Tenth Amendment
violation); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 758 (1982) (analyzing whether the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act was a Tenth Amendment violation); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243
(1983) (analyzing whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act was a Tenth Amendment
violation).
25. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
26. KATHLEEN SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTIrUTIONAL LAW 182-83 (15th ed.
2004).
27. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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state legislatures. 28 Although the commerce power authorized the chal-
lenged act in New York, it interfered with the state's exercise of its sover-
eignty. While the facts of the case are inconsequential for purposes of
this paper, New York is interesting because it marks the re-emergence of
the Tenth Amendment as a substantive limitation on federal action. The
Court has reaffirmed the reasoning set forth in New York in several sub-
29sequent decisions.
Essentially, the Court's most recent interpretations of the Tenth
Amendment hold that it is a substantive right protecting the sovereignty
of the states. It does so by limiting the federal government to only those
powers enumerated by the United States Constitution. Further, it limits
the federal government's legitimate exercise of power when that exercise
would interfere with a state's sovereignty.
B. Standing
Generally, the question of standing is simply, "Do we have the cor-
rect plaintiff for this case?" Traditionally, courts analyze a plaintiffs
standing to bring his claim independent of the merits of the plaintiffs
claim. 30 The United States Constitution imposes the requirement of
standing through the "cases" and "controversies" clauses. 31  These
clauses require that parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy ' 32 that they present the "concrete adverse-
ness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
To insure this personal stake, Article III courts (the only courts affected
by the "cases" and "controversies" requirements) have, in addition, im-
posed a prudential requirement that will not allow a party to "rest his
claim to relief on the rights of another who does not press those rights. 34
In other words, if A suffers an injury, B cannot bring a lawsuit on A's
behalf.35 Furthermore, when determining whether a party has standing,
the court will apply the summary judgment standard and accept as true
all material allegations of the complaint, and construe the complaint in
favor of the complaining party.36
28. New York, 505 U.S. at 156.
29. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 898; Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
30. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I[I § 2.
32. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
33. Baker, 369 U.S. at 204.
34. Mountain States Legal Found. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 754, 761 (10th Cir. 1980); Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978).
35. This ignores some jus tertii assertions that allow this in a few specific situations, such as a
parent representing a child's interest. See Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L.
REv. 277 (1984).
36. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
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Prudential requirements are generally attributed to Justices Brandeis
and Frankfurter.37 Both of these justices advocated judicial deference to
the democratic process by invoking justiciability doctrines such as ripe-
ness,38 reviewability39 and standing4° to avoid reviewing legislative ac-
tions.
In 1992, the Court offered a succinct statement of the standing re-
quirement in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife:
41
Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible consti-
tutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the
plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"-an invasion of a le-
gally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and
(b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical."' Second,
there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of-the injury has to be "fairly . . . trace[able] to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the
independent action of some third party not before the court." Third, it
must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury
will be "redressed by a favorable decision."
42
Justice Scalia stated that these requirements are imposed by the
"case and controversy" requirement of Article III. However, he also
admits, "some of its elements express merely prudential considera-
tions. ' '43 One of the prudential considerations is the third-party standing
bar, as articulated by the "injury" requirement. The Constitution does
not require that the plaintiff be the injured party. The case and contro-
versy requirement would be satisfied simply if there were an injury, re-
gardless of who the plaintiff is. Therefore, the third-party standing bar is
a prudential requirement.
As a side note, because the third-party standing bar is a prudential
requirement, Congress can bypass that requirement statutorily, such as in
qui tam statutes" and "citizen suit statutes."45 However, such Congres-
37. Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan ? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries, " and Article
111, 91 MICH. L REV. 163, 179 (1992) [hereinafter Sunstein].
38. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938) (case dismissed
for, among other reasons, failure to exhaust administrative remedies).
39. See FCC v. CBS of Cal., 311 U.S. 132, 136 (1940) (case dismissed for lack of reviewabil-
ity).
40. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 154-55 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring); see also Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341-45 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
41. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
42. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (citations omitted).
43. Id. at 560.
44. See Sunstein, supra note 37, at 175 (discussing the history of qui tam suits in American
jurisprudence). See Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341,
388 n.1 [hereinafter Caminker] (The phrase "qui tam" is shorthand for "qui tam pro domino rege
quam pro se imposo sequitur," interpreted as "who brings the action as well for the king as for
himself"). Usually, a qui tam statute grants an individual the right to file suit for enforcement of that
statute, even when the individual has no personal interest or injury, beyond the "bounty" offered by
2005]
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sional waiver to the third-party standing bar is outside the scope of this
survey, and will not be addressed here.
III. PRECEDENT
A. Supreme Court
One of the early decisions on the issue of "private attorneys gen-
eral '4 6 litigating Tenth Amendment violations was Tenn. Elec. Power
Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth.47 In 1933, the United States Congress passed
the Tennessee Valley Authority Act.48 Under this Act, the Tennessee
Valley Authority ("Tennessee") was to erect a series of dams on the Ten-
nessee River to control flooding and produce power.49 Several power
companies, including the Tennessee Electric Power Company, filed suit
seeking to have Tennessee enjoined from producing power and thereby
competing with them.50 One of the plaintiffs' contentions was that the
Act violated the Tenth Amendment because it "result[ed] in federal regu-
lation of the internal affairs of the states' 5 ' and was outside of the enu-
merated powers of the federal government. The Court rejected this con-
tention by holding that "[t]he sale of government property [power] in
competition with others is not a violation of the Tenth Amendment."
52
The Court further stated that "there is no objection to the Authority's
operations by the states, and, if this were not so, the appellants, absent
the states or their officers, have no standing in this suit to raise any ques-
tion under the amendment.,
53
Several taxpayer cases have also suggested that rights under the
Tenth Amendment belonged only to the states. In Frothingham v. Mel-
lon,54 the plaintiff alleged that the Maternity Act of 1921 5 exceeded
the suit. Id. at 345. See also Joan H. Krause, Health Care Providers And The Public Fisc: Paradigms
Of Government Harm Under The Civil False Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REv. 121, 125 (2001) (discuss-
ing contemporary qui tam actions under the Civil False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733
(1994)).
45. Sunstein, supra note 37, at 223-25 (discussing the viability of citizen suits after Lujan). A
"citizen suit" statute grants an individual the right to file suit for enforcement of that statute when the
individual's injury or interest is representative of the public injury. Caminker, supra note 44, at 345.
Compare this with the qui tam statutes. Id.
46. Caminker, supra note 44, at 343 ("Individuals bringing suits of either [qui tam or citizen]
type are often called 'private attorneys general'.....
47. 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
48. 73 Cong. Ch. 32,48 Stat. 58 (1933).
49. Id.
50. Gershengorn, supra note 8, at 1073.
51. Tennessee, 306 U.S. at 136.
52. Id. at 144.
53. Id.
54. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). This case was decided together with a companion case Massachu-
setts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), so some references refer to this case name. The Frothingham
case involved an individual's standing, whereas the Mellon case, based on the same controversy,
involved the State's standing on the exact same issue. Id. at 478-79. Since this article is concerned
with individual standing, I will ignore the Mellon companion case.
55. 67 Cong. Ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224 (1921).
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Congress' "enumerated powers" under Article I, §8. The Maternity Act
authorized appropriations to reduce infant and maternal mortality. 5 The
plaintiff contended that the Act "invades the local concerns of the State,
and is a usurpation of power."57 The Court held that the plaintiff did not
have standing because she was seeking to enforce the legislative power
of the state.
58
Later, in Flast v. Cohen,59 the Supreme Court again implied that
only a state had standing to assert a Tenth Amendment violation.60 In
Flast, the plaintiff sought review of the trial court's dismissal of his case
for lack of standing. 61 In the trial court, the plaintiff had alleged that the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 196562 violated the Estab-
lishment and Free Exercise clauses of the First Amendment63 because it
provided federal funds for religious schools. 64 The Court held that unlike
Ms. Frothingham, Mr. Flast had standing. The Court held that while Ms.
Frothingham was asserting the state's rights, Mr. Flast was, in fact, as-
serting personal rights.65 Therefore, Mr. Flast was not asserting "third
party" rights.
Given the holdings in Flast and Frothingham, one might conclude
that a private individual would only have standing to pursue a case as-
serting private rights, not state's rights. In essence, a private individual
can only pursue a Tenth Amendment claim when the contested federal
action violates a personal right, not the rights conferred merely by the
individual's status as a taxpayer or a citizen of his or her state.
However, several cases imply that an individual's right to pursue a
Tenth Amendment claim does exist.66 The Court, in deciding some of
the New Deal era cases on the merits, must have granted the parties
standing by implication,67 because a lack of standing would have resulted
in the Court's dismissal of the case sua sponte.68 For example, in
Helvering v. Davis,69 the plaintiff claimed that the Social Security pro-
gram was an invasion of the state's Tenth Amendment rights.70 In reject-
56. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 479.
57. Id. at 480.
58. Id.
59. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
60. Flast, 392 U.S. at 126.
61. Id. at 106.
62. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965).
63. Flast, 392 U.S. at 86-87.
64. Id. at 85-86.
65. Gershengorn, supra note 8, at 1073-74.
66. See, e.g., Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 646 (1937); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301
U.S. 548, 598 (1937).
67. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. U. S. Dep't of Energy, 666 F.2d 1359, 1368 (11 th Cir. 1982).
68. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992).
69. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 619.
70. Id. at 637.
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ing this contention, the Court granted standing by implication by decid-
ing the case on the merits.7'
In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group,72 the Court
noted that there is a prudential limitation whereby "the plaintiff generally
must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to
relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties., 73 In Lujan v. De-
fenders of Wildlife,74 the Supreme Court stated that this prudential limita-
tion, while not a bar per se, is a severe obstruction for a plaintiff." The
Court noted that when the plaintiff is not himself the object of the gov-
ernment action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it
is ordinarily "substantially more difficult" to establish.76
The Court dealt with an individual's right to act as a private attor-
ney general in two recent cases. The first was Lujan.77 In 1978, the Fish
& Wildlife Service ("FWS") issued an interpretation of the Endangered
Species Act.78 In 1983, the FWS reversed its interpretation.79 The De-
fenders of Wildlife then filed suit seeking the court to enjoin the FWS to
reinstate the earlier interpretation. 80 The Supreme Court first noted that
when the plaintiff is the subject of the legislation, there is "ordinarily
little question that the action or inaction has [affected him]," and that he
would therefore have standing. 8' After noting that the subject of the leg-
islation was the protection of the endangered species and not the protec-
tion of the plaintiffs, the Court therefore stated that the plaintiffs must
present evidence that one of the members of the Defenders of Wildlife
would "be 'directly' affected. 82  In other words, the plaintiffs would
have to show that they had a personal injury or interest in the case. Find-
ing that none of the plaintiffs had a sufficient injury or interest in the
case, the Supreme Court dismissed the case for lack of standing. In a
curiously worded opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court stated that "[t]he
[plaintiff's] profession of an 'intent' to return to the places they had vis-
ited before-where they will presumably, this time, be deprived of the
opportunity to observe animals of the endangered species-is simply not
enough [to qualify as an injury]."
83
71. See id. at 640.
72. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
73. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 80.
74. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555.
75. Id. at 562; Gershengorn, supra note 8, at 1074.
76. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562.
77. Id. at 555.
78. Id. at 558.
79. Id. at 558-59.
80. Id. at 559.
81. Id. at 561-62.
82. Id. at 563.
83. Id. at 564; Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Souter, offered a foreshadowing of the
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000), case by stating that a
[Vol. 82:3
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Compare Lujan with Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services.8 In Laidlaw, the plaintiffs sought a Court order compelling
Laidlaw to comply with the Clean Water Act.85 The plaintiffs submitted
affidavits stating that the river was currently unusable for recreation be-
cause Laidlaw was polluting it. 86 The Court held that, unlike the plain-
tiffs in Lujan, the violation of the legislation created a sufficient nexus
and "directly affected [the plaintiffs'] recreational, aesthetic, and eco-
nomic interests" which could not be "equated with the speculative 'some
day' intentions to visit endangered species halfway around the world that
we held insufficient to show injury in [Lujan]." 87 These cases seem to
imply that only a "sufficient nexus" between the legislation and the al-
leged injury could overcome the third-party prudential bar. Although
Lujan and Laidlaw deal with non-Tenth Amendment standing, they are
the most recent cases decided by the Supreme Court on the general issue
of standing.
B. Circuit Split
The federal courts in several circuits are split on the issue of
whether a private individual has standing to pursue a Tenth Amendment
violation claim.88 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address this
precise point in Pierce County v. Guillen.89 However, the Court decided
the case on other grounds and left the standing question for another
day. 90
Several courts, including the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit,91 the United States District Court for the District of Ver-
mont,92 and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana 3 have all rejected "private attorney general" standing. Gener-
ally, these courts have interpreted the Tenth Amendment as protecting a
state's rights, not an individual's rights, as declared in Tennessee. 4
nexus theory in different circumstance would be enough to grant standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 579
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
84. 528 U.S. 167 (2000),
85. Laidlaw, 582 U.S. at 177.
86. JA. at 184.
87. Id.
88. Compare Mountain States Legal Found. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 754, 761 (10th Cir. 1980)
(holding that a private individual does not have standing to pursue Tenth Amendment claims), with
Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 703-04 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that a private indi-
vidual does have standing to pursue Tenth Amendment claims).
89. 537 U.S. 129 (2003).
90. Guillen, 537 U.S. at 148 n.10.
91. Costle, 630F2d at 761.
92. Vermont Assembly of Home Health Agencies, Inc. v. Shalala, 18 F. Supp. 2d 355, 371
(D. Vt. 1998).
93. Gaubert v. Denton, 1999 U.S. Dist. LBXIS 8207 (E.D, La. May 28, 1999), affd, 210 F.3d
368 (5th Cir. 2000).
94. Tennessee, 306 U.S. at 144 ('the appellants, absent the states or their officers, have no
standing in this suit to raise any question under the amendment").
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These courts have also heavily relied on the prudential third-party bar set
forth in Duke Power.
95
In Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Costle,96 a plaintiff chal-
lenged a provision of the Clean Air Act 97 under which the Environmental
Protection Agency had the authority to approve or disapprove Colorado's
clean air policies.98 In dismissing the case for lack of standing, the Tenth
Circuit cited Duke Power and held that "[o]nly the State has standing to
press claims aimed at protecting its sovereign powers under the Tenth
Amendment." 99 The Court also noted that the Colorado Supreme Court
had previously held that "[u]nless a statute provides otherwise, the attor-
ney general has the exclusive right to represent the state in actions to
enforce its interests."' l In this case, not only did the Attorney General
of Colorado not wish to enforce Colorado's interests, he, to the contrary,
intervened and held a position that was at odds to the plaintiffs' posi-
tion.1°1
In reaching a similar conclusion in Vermont Assembly of Home
Health Agencies, Inc. v. Shalala,'2 the Vermont District Court relied on
Tennessee and found that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
had only extended the right to maintain a Tenth Amendment suit to mu-
nicipalities, but not to individuals.10 3 The plaintiff contended that the
Balanced Budget Act of 19971°4 was unconstitutional because the Medi-
care reimbursement scheme interfered with the Vermont's health care
policy. 10 5 In dismissing the case for lack of standing, the court noted that
although the State of Vermont filed an amicus brief in support of the
plaintiff's position, the state did not join the lawsuit.
Finally, in Gaubert v. Denton,10 6 the Eastern Louisiana District
court relied on both Shalala and Costle in finding that a plaintiff could
not pursue a Tenth Amendment claim. 10 7 When Mr. Gaubert was in-
volved in a traffic accident, he filed suit against the State of Louisiana in
state court, claiming that the state had negligently maintained the road.'08
Mr. Gaubert requested road safety data compiled by the State of Louisi-
ana as required by the Federal Highway Safety Act ("FHSA"). °9 The
95. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 80; see supra note 73 and accompanying text.
96. Costle, 630 F.2d at 754.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2004).
98. Costle, 630 F.2d at 759.
99. Id. at 761.
100. ld. at 763.
101. ld. at 761.
102. Shalala, 18 F Supp. 2d at 371.
103. Id.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x (1997).
105. Shalala, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 358.
106. 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8207, at *1 (E.D. La. May 28, 1999).
107. Gauben, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8207, at *2.
108. Id.
109. 23 U.S.C. § 401 (2004).
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state refused to release the data based on sections of the FHSA" that
specifically prohibited usage of the safety data as evidence. Since Mr.
Gaubert challenged the constitutionality of a portion of the FHSA, the
state court stayed the case and referred the constitutionality question to
the federal court."'
Mr. Gaubert filed suit in federal court claiming that since the FHSA
exceeded the government's enumerated powers, it was an invasion of
state sovereignty and a violation of the Tenth Amendment." 2 The fed-
eral court, relying on Shalala and Tennessee, stated that Mr. Gaubert
could not maintain the suit against the federal government. 13 The court
also noted that, similar to Costle, the state assumed a position contrary to
the plaintiff's.
The courts in each of these holdings have impliedly adopted the
Tennessee position that the Tenth Amendment only protects the rights of
states, not the rights of individuals. 114 These cases stand for the proposi-
tion that a private plaintiff cannot represent the state's interest in a Tenth
Amendment claim, even when there is an "identity of interest" between
the plaintiff and the state.
However, the holdings of these courts are at odds with decisions
made by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,"
15
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit," 6 and the
United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina.17
As opposed to the previously mentioned cases, these courts allowed the
"private attorney general" standing by allowing any "injury or threatened
injury' ' 1 to overcome the third-party standing bar. These courts also
rely on the assertion of individual rights in pursuing the Tenth Amend-
ment claim,119 in keeping with the Flast 2° and Frothingharn'21 line of
cases. It is also noteworthy that these courts have allowed any "injury or
threatened injury" to create the nexus advocated by Justice Kennedy in
his concurring Lujan opinion and in the Laidlaw decision.1
22
In the Seventh Circuit case of Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis,
the plaintiff contended that Gun Control Act of 1968124 unconstitution-
110. 23 U.S.C. §§ 402(k), 409 (2004).
111. Gaubert, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8207, at *2.
112. Id. at *7.
113. Id. at * 13-14.
114. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
115. Seniors Civil Liberties Ass'n v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030, 1034 (1 1th Cir. 1992).
116. See Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 1999).
117. Gilliard v. Kirk, 633 F. Supp. 1529, 1549 (W.D.N.C. 1986), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987).
118. Kemp, 965 F.2d at 1034.
119. Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 703.
120. See supra note 59.
121. See supra note 54.
122. See supra note 83.
123. 185 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 1999).
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ally prevented him from carrying a gun. 125 Since he had been convicted
of domestic violence, Gillespie could not carry a gun, which caused him
to lose his job as a police officer. 126 Gillespie contended that the statute
dictated to states as to how it can select members of its militia.'2 7 In do-
ing so, Gillespie claims that the federal government was "compelling
state officers to implement a federal statute and by intruding upon areas
of traditional state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment."
' 128
Holding that Gillespie had standing to pursue the Tenth Amendment
claim, the Seventh Circuit stated that "as New York explains, the Tenth
Amendment, although nominally protecting state sovereignty, ultimately
secures the rights of individuals."' 29 Therefore, Gillespie could assert
that the federal government violated his personal rights when it violated
the Tenth Amendment. 130  Although Gillespie lost on the merits, the
Court did grant him standing.'131
The Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand, reached the same conclu-
sion in Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. U. S. Dep't of Energy,132 but reached it
through different reasoning. In Atlanta Gas, the Court tried to modernize
the Supreme Court Tenth Amendment standing precedent by discerning
modern trends. The court held that "under Duke Power, the petitioners
may make constitutional objections based on any of [a federal Act's]
provisions so long as they show the requisite injury in fact and its causal
relation to the action in question."'133 Although this approach seems in-
compatible with cases such as Frothingham and Tennessee, the Court
interpreted the New Deal era "standing by implication" cases discussed
above as a modem trend, which suggest how the Supreme Court would
rule should it face the issue.
34
Finally, the District Court case of Gilliard also allowed a private
plaintiff standing; however, this court's reasoning follows Flast and
Frothingham. 135 Gilliard was filed on behalf of children affected by an
amendment to Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC").
This amendment required child support payments to be included as fam-
ily income, which reduced the AFDC entitlement. The suit alleged that
the AFDC amendments invaded state's domestic relations law, which the
124. 18 U.S.C.S. § 922 (1968).
125. Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 697.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 700.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 703.
130. Id. Some of the cases on Second Amendment make an assumption that the Second
Amendment guarantees personal rights. For example, the Supreme Court has held that the Second
Amendment grants the right to "keep and bear arms" only when connected with the state's need to
maintain a "well regulated militia." United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
131. Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 703.
132. 666 F.2d 1359 (1 lth Cir. 1982).
133. Atlanta Gas, 666 F.2d at 1368.
134. Id.
135. See supra notes 54, 59.
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Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized as a state matter.' 36 The court
held that although the Tenth Amendment, as a "constitutional norm,"
regulates relations between governments rather than the relations be-
tween governments and individuals, individuals should have standing to
assert constitutional protections derived from them. 137 Since the children
were, in fact, asserting personal rights, not the state's right, the court held
that the private plaintiffs did have standing. 
138
While the above discussed cases have granted a private individual
standing, the courts in these decisions have not specifically contradicted
Tennessee; rather, they have found reasons why Tennessee should not
apply. In general, these cases have actually accepted the Tennessee posi-
tion that a private plaintiff cannot assert a state's rights. However, if the
plaintiff is asserting private rights, he may pursue a Tenth Amendment
claim against a federal statute.
IV. UNITED STATES V. PARKER
139
A. Facts
On October 3, 2002, Dale Parker drove his truck onto a military in-
stallation in Utah to do some civilian contract work.' 4 Because of a ran-
dom, authorized search, a military policeman located a loaded weapon in
Mr. Parker's truck.14' The military police detained Mr. Parker 142 and
charged him with violation of the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act
("ACA"). 143 Specifically, Mr. Parker violated a Utah law 144 against car-
rying a loaded firearm in a vehicle or on a public street. Since this
violation was on federal land, the ACA required the court to apply the
relevant Utah law.
Mr. Parker filed a motion to dismiss under the Second and Tenth
Amendments. 46 Specifically, Mr. Parker contended that the prosecution,
pursuant to the ACA, violated his right to bear arms. 147 Further, Mr.
Parker claimed that the authority to regulate Second Amendment rights is
a sovereign right of the state under the Tenth Amendment; therefore, the
136. Gilliard, 633 F. Supp. at 1549.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 362 F. 3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004).
140. Parker, 362 F. 3d at 1280.
141. Id. at 1281.
142. Id.
143. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2003); The purpose of the ACA is to borrow state law to fill gaps in the
federal criminal law that applies on federal enclaves. United States v. Adams, 140 F.3d 895, 896
(10th Cir. 1998). The ACA thus provides "a method of punishing a crime committed on government
reservations in the way and to the extent that it would have been punishable if committed within the
surrounding jurisdiction." Id.
144. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-505 (2003).
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ACA was unconstitutional because it allowed the United States to im-
pede state sovereignty by prosecuting him under the Second Amend-
ment.148 At trial, a magistrate judge found Mr. Parker guilty and fined
him $100.14 9 Mr. Parker appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Since Mr. Parker was contesting the constitutionality of the ACA statute,
the Court of Appeals applied de novo review.
150
B. Decision
After denying Parker's Second Amendment claim, the court consid-
ered his Tenth Amendment claim sua sponte,15' i.e., whether Mr. Parker
had standing to pursue the Tenth Amendment claim. 52 In dismissing the
Tenth Amendment claim for lack of standing, the Court relied heavily on
Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Costle.'53 In Costle, the Court
found that because the interests of the state did not coincide with the
interests of the plaintiff, 54 the plaintiff could not pursue the Tenth
Amendment claim. In Parker, the court stated "[s]imply put, we would
be hard pressed to conclude that Parker is representing Utah's inter-
ests.' 55 The court also did not believe "that the Tenth Amendment is
violated when the federal government acts to enforce a Utah law which is
violated on a federal enclave."'
56
Ultimately, the court affirmed Mr. Parker's conviction and dis-
missed the Tenth Amendment claim for lack of standing. Part V of this
paper will examine the reasoning behind this decision and will advocate
that the court should have allowed Mr. Parker standing to pursue his
Tenth Amendment claim.
V. ANALYSIS
Although the court dismissed Parker's case as essentially a frivolous
claim, the issue of constitutional standing must be decided without re-
gard to the merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim. The United States
v. Parker157 decision does not follow the cited precedent, nor is it recon-
cilable with recent decisions from other circuits. In this case, the Tenth
Circuit applied precedent that was too factually specific to apply properly
to this case. Further, the court cited other precedent that was neither




151. Although beyond the scope of this survey, the "right to bear arms" discussion provides an
interesting review of pertinent Second Amendment caselaw. See id. at 1282-84.
152. Id. at 1284.
153. Id. at 1285; Mountain States Legal Found. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1980).
154. Parker, 362 F.3d at 1285; Costle, 630 F.2d at 754.
155. Parker, 362 F.3d at 1285.
156. Id.
157. 362 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004).
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Parker standing and, subsequently, dismissed the Tenth Amendment
claim on its merits.
The Parker court placed great emphasis on its earlier decision of
Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Costle.158 From Costle, the court
first re-affirmed the "identity of interest" argument. 59 The essence of
this argument is that if a "private attorney general" does not have an
identical interest as that of the state in opposing the federal action, the
private plaintiff cannot represent the state's interest through a Tenth
Amendment action. In Costle, the state intervened and assumed a posi-
tion contrary to the plaintiff, therefore, the Court concluded, the plaintiff
did not have standing. 60 The reasoning employed by the court in Costle
in 1980 is no longer appropriate because of the 1992 Supreme Court de-
cision of New York v. United States.'61 In that case, the United States
Supreme Court held that a state could not surrender its sovereign power,
even by agreement. 62 Therefore, in a "private attorney general" cause of
action, under the precedent of New York, the state's position becomes
irrelevant. The proper question is whether the federal government in-
truded upon a state's sovereignty, not whether the plaintiff was advocat-
ing the same position that the state would have advocated.
It is also unlikely that following its decision in New York, the Su-
preme Court would hold that a state could both agree to surrender its
sovereign power, and also deny the sole avenue through which a citizen
might contest such a surrender of power. If a court denies individuals
standing when their interests do not coincide with the state's interests, at
least in the situation where the state agrees to the surrender, there is very
little possibility of objecting to the Tenth Amendment violation without
allowing individual, "private" objections.
However, even if we assume that New York did not apply, the
court's finding that "we would be hard pressed to conclude that Parker is
representing Utah's interests"1 63 seems incorrect on its face. There
seems to be an identity of interest in this case, because both Mr. Parker
and Utah have an interest in preventing the federal government from
violating Utah's sovereign rights. The motivation behind the interest is
irrelevant. It does not matter why Mr. Parker wants to prevent the fed-
eral government from violating the Tenth Amendment; it only matters
that he is representing and advancing Utah's sovereign rights. Although
the court did not examine Utah's interests, it seems likely that those in-
terests would include protection of its sovereign rights.
158. Parker, 362 F.3d at 1285.
159. Id.
160. Mountain States Legal Found. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 754, 761 (10th Cir. 1980).
161. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
162. New York, 505 U.S. at 182.
163. Parker, 362 F.3d at 1285.
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The second holding from Costle identified by the Parker court was
the "sole protector" argument. 164 This argument, as delineated in Parker,
is that "only the State has standing to press claims aimed at protecting its
sovereign powers under the Tenth Amendment."' 65 This notion was de-
rived from the Colorado Supreme Court interpretation of Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 24-3 1-101 (1)(a), which grants the Attorney General the exclusive right,
in the absence of a statute providing otherwise, to represent the state in
actions to protect its interests. 166 Even ignoring for a moment the possi-
ble invalidity of this holding after New York, this finding was too factu-
ally specific to Costle to apply in Mr. Parker's case. Costle involved
Colorado statutes, 167 whereas Parker involves Utah law. 68 Therefore, a
holding derived from Colorado law is inapplicable to a case decided un-
der Utah law.
Another case relied on by the court in Parker is the Tennessee
case. 169 As discussed previously, it is unlikely that the dictum from Ten-
nessee is still applicable. In light of the New York decision, a blanket
statement that a private citizen would not have standing in a Tenth
Amendment claim is probably incorrect because the only way to prevent
a state from surrendering its sovereignty is for a private citizen to file
suit. Therefore, there must be some circumstances in which a private
citizen could maintain a Tenth Amendment claim.
If we assume for a moment that the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals had decided Parker, it is likely that it would have granted Mr.
Parker Tenth Amendment standing. Following the reasoning in Gillespie
v. City of Indianapolis,170 the Court would probably find that Mr. Parker
was asserting personal rights, similar to the assertions of Mr. Gillespie.1
71
The Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Gillespie was that under New York,
all rights guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment are, in fact, rights of the
individual. 172
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit would probably also have held that
Mr. Parker had standing, given the "modem trend" followed by that
court. 173 Although there seemed to be some hesitancy in the Eleventh
Circuit's decision, 74 it is likely that given the recent Supreme Court de-
164. Id.; Costle, 630 F.2d at 761.
165. Parker, 362 F.3d at 1285; Costle, 630 F.2d at 761.
166. State Board of Pharmacy v. Hallett, 88 Colo. 331, 296 P. 540, 541 (1931) (discussing the
statutory predecessor of C.R.S. § 24-31-101).
167. Costle, 630 F.2d at 771.
168. Parker, 362 F.3d at 1280.
169. Id. at 1285.
170. Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 1999).
171. Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 703.
172. Id.
173. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 666 F.2d 1359, 1368 (11 th Cir. 1982).
174. The court stated, "we must initially express our uncertainty about whether the petitioners
have standing to raise the Tenth Amendment question." Atlanta Gas, 666 F.2d at 1368; see also
Gershengorn, supra note 8, at 1079.
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cisions, as discussed below, regarding the Tenth Amendment and the
power of states in general, the Eleventh Circuit would probably more
readily grant Mr. Parker standing.
If the Supreme Court grants certiorari in Parker, it is likely that it
would grant standing to Mr. Parker. The "nexus" requirement of both
Justice Kennedy's concurring Lujan opinion and the Laidlaw decision is
probably satisfied. 75 That is, there is likely a sufficient nexus between
the alleged Tenth Amendment violation and Mr. Parker's injury. Mr.
Parker's arrest-because of the federal prosecution of a state-regulated
area-presents a sufficient nexus to warrant a finding that Mr. Parker has
standing. Further, this nexus is even stronger than the Laidlaw plaintiff's
inability to use the river. However, some commentators have attributed
the relaxation of the standing requirement by Laidlaw as attributable to
the unique nature of environmental issues, 176 and, therefore, it might not
be appropriate in this context. However, even disregarding the environ-
mental standing analysis, the Court would likely find that Mr. Parker did
have standing based on the New York rationale.
Overall, the modem trend in the Rehnquist Supreme Court is to be
very conscious of state sovereignty. 77 With modem cases such as New
York v. United States, 178 Printz v. United States, 79 and Reno v. Con-
don,'8 0 there can be little question that the Rehnquist court has estab-
lished a trend of promoting state sovereignty by limiting federal
power.18t In each of these cases, the Supreme Court has stressed the
sovereignty of the state. Furthermore, with the reelection of President
George W. Bush, it is likely that the "conservative" camp of the Supreme
Court will expand with new appointments. 18
2
In Printz, the Supreme Court considered a federal statute that at-
tempted to direct state officers to enforce federal legislation.' 83 In hold-
175. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
176. See Emily Longfellow, Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services: A New
Look at Environmental Standing, 24 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 3, 14 (2000); See also Richard
J. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47
UCLA L. REV. 703, 744-745 (2000).
177. Christopher P. Banks, The Constitutional Politics of Interpreting Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 425, 451 (2003) (describing the Rehnquist court's use of
Tenth and Eleventh Amendment to promote state rights).
178. New York, 505 U.S. at 182 (finding unconstitutional a statute that tried to direct a state
legislature to follow federal legislation).
179. 521 U.S. 898, 944-45 (1997) (finding unconstitutional a statute that tried to direct a state
official to follow federal legislation).
180. 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000) (rejecting a claim of an unconstitutional statute because the
statute did not regulate the sovereignty of the state). The opinion includes an extensive discussion of
the substantive role of the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 149-51.
181. Gershengorn, supra note 8, at 1070.
182. See Derek H. Davis, Mitchell v. Helms and the Modern Cultural Assault on the Separa-
tion of Church and State, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1035, 1064 (2002) (analyzing then-Governor Bush's
conservative appointments to the Texas Supreme Court).
183. Printz, 521 U.S. at 902, 935.
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ing the statute unconstitutional, the Court made clear its desire to main-
tain the "[p]reservation of the States as independent and autonomous
entities.' 84 Even in Reno, where the Supreme Court found that a statute
regulating the state's sale of driver's license information was valid, 185 the
Court stressed that the statute regulated state activities;' 86 it was not
"seeking to control or influence" state activities. 87 The extensive dis-
cussion on the limitations of federal power by the Tenth Amendment in
Reno'88 highlights the deference that the Rehnquist Supreme Court has
given to state sovereignty. Even in the Reno case where the Supreme
Court denied the unconstitutionality claim of a statute that imposed a
burden on a state, it was careful to explain why this statute was not an
imposition on the state sovereignty. 189 Given this "empowering" of the
state, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would deny Mr. Parker stand-
ing in the instant case.
If we adopt the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in the instant case, the
conclusion is that the Tenth Amendment only protects a state's rights.' 90
By declaring that only a state has standing to pursue a Tenth Amendment
claim, the Tenth Circuit's interpretation would necessarily preclude an
individual from pursing a Tenth Amendment claim. However, we should
consider the actual text of the Tenth Amendment: "The powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."' 9' If we
accept the Tenth Circuit's interpretation, then the clause "or to the peo-
ple" from the Tenth Amendment becomes meaningless. As far back as
1803, the Supreme Court has advocated interpretations that do not nullify
portions of the Constitution. 92 In fact, Chief Justice Marshall stated,
"[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to
be without effect; and therefore such a construction is inadmissible,
unless the words require it."'193 However, with the Parker holding, the
Tenth Circuit has stated that the clause "or to the people" is meaning-
less.' 94 If, as the Tenth Circuit holds, a private individual cannot pursue
a Tenth Amendment Claim, 95 then the phrase is without effect. Com-
pare this interpretation with the Seventh Circuit's interpretation: "Gilles-
pie, in making Tenth Amendment claims, actually is asserting his own
184. Id. at 928.
185. Reno, 528 U.S. at 143.
186. Id. at 150.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 148-51.
189. Id. at 150.
190. Costle, 630 F.2d at 771.
191. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
192. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803).
193. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 174 (emphasis added).
194. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
195. Parker, 362 F.3d at 1285.
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rights." 96 The Seventh Circuit's interpretation gives the clause "or to the
people" effect and meaning. Therefore, this interpretation is in keeping
with the notion of giving effect to every clause of the Constitution,
whereas the Tenth Circuit's interpretation does not.
Finally, if we look at the purpose of the structure of the Constitu-
tion, it is to protect the rights of individuals. The "dual sovereignty"
principles of federalism protect the rights of citizens. It does this by
avoiding the creation of a "tyranny" by preventing the accumulation of
too much power in one place. 197 Since the framers specifically designed
the Constitution to protect individuals, it would seem prudent to allow
those individuals to object to actions that cause consolidate power where
it should not be. The separation of powers protects the individual. Any
violation of that separation would therefore harm the individual. There-
fore, the individual should be able to advocate his own interest by being
able to pursue a Tenth Amendment claim.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit held that Mr. Parker was not the correct plaintiff
to pursue the Tenth Amendment claim. What would have been a better
conclusion is that Mr. Parker did have standing but that his Tenth
Amendment claim was without merit. As the Court stated, the Tenth
Amendment is not violated when the federal government merely seeks to
"enforce a Utah law which is violated on a federal enclave."' 98 This rea-
soning is appropriate for a decision on the merits, not for a dismissal for
lack of standing.
Given the modem "trend" of respecting state sovereignty, the Su-
preme Court would likely grant standing to an individual who wished to
promote state sovereignty. However, even a court that did not champion
state sovereignty would probably overturn such a restrictive finding that
only a state can pursue a Tenth Amendment claim, since it nullifies a
clause of the constitution.
In general, it would probably be better in line with the constitutional
guarantees of the Tenth Amendment, and the principles of federalism to
grant private individuals standing to pursue Tenth Amendment claims
individually. This is especially true where, as in Parker, there may be a
Tenth Amendment violation, but either the state consented to it or the
state is not interested in objecting to it. The ultimate inquiry should lie in
whether the federal actions are constitutional, not in whether the best
plaintiff is present to challenge them. Although the standing requirement
is obviously a prerequisite for the "cases and controversies" requirement,
196. Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 703.
197. See THE FEDERALIST No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 51 (James Madison).
198. United States v. Parker, 362 F.3d 1279, 1285 (10th Cir. 2004).
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courts should broadly grant individual standing in Tenth Amendment
cases by eliminating the third-party standing bar.
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